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ABSTRACT
Three pairs of parallel R&D projects are
examined. The data analyzed were gathered by means
of Solution Development Records--a form which pro-
vides a weekly estimate of the probability of adop-
tion of the approaches under consideration as pos-
sible solutions to a technical problem. It is found
that the longer an approach is indicated by these
forms to be in a favored position, the more diffi-
cult it is to reject. Furthermore, the number of al-
ternative technical approaches considered bears a
relation to judged solution quality. Groups pro-
ducing higher-rated solutions generated fewer ap-
proaches during the course of the project, and
they more closely approach an ideal strategy of
approaches off on a two-at-a-t ime basis than do their
poorer performing rivals.

The research and development process provides a challenge to the
behavioral scientist who wants to study the process of human problem sol-
ving in vivo. Engineers and scientists i n R & D laboratories devote their
careers to the solving of rather sophisticated problems, and the study of
their behavior should tell us much about the higher mental processes.
Such a study, however, presents the researcher with two difficulties
which he must resolve. The first of these is access. Access must be
gained, not only to the laboratory under study, but to the subtle men-
tal processes of individual scientists. This is a standard problem in
psychology, but the real-life environment serves to compound it.
Observable indices that in some way provide valid, reliable estimates
of the actual cognitive data must be established. In addition to
validity and reliability the indices must further be highly efficient
in terms of the time required on the part of subjects. The latter re-
quirement is imposed by the field situation, and is absolutely essen-
tial to the recruitment of cooperative subjects.
The second difficulty to be faced is that of problem comparability
and solution evaluation. In the psychological laboratory, this is easily
managed by assigning the same problem to large numbers of college so-
phomores. The substance of the problem is controlled so that a valid
comparison can be made of the subjects' approaches. In addition, the
problems are generally of a type which has but one correct solution. The
sample of problems can then be split into those having correct and incor-
rect solutions and approaches may be related to success rate.

-2
METHOD
While we, as researchers, have not reached the level of affluence
where we can h i re a number of engineers and assign them the same pro-
blem, there are organizations such as N.A.S.A. and the Department of
Defense who can. For this reason, instances in which two or more
R&D laboratories have been awarded a contract to perform the same
preliminary design or research investigation were sought out for study,
At the present time, about a dozen sets of two or three parallel
projects have been located and studied. This paper will present the
results of an analysis of three of the earliest completed sets.
Once a parallel project has been located, its work statement is
obtained and analyzed and factored into a reasonable number of sub-
problem areas (generally subsystems). The breakdown is then checked
with the technical person who prepared the work statement, and data
collection forms based upon it are designed. After all data have been
collected from the contractors, the technical monitor is revisited
and asked to provide a confidential evaluation of each lab's perfor-
mance on each subproblem. Data are gathered by four means: (I)
time allocation forms, indicating the amount of time each engineer
spends on the job in several activity categories; (2) before and after
interviews with individual engineers: (3) periodic tape recorded pro-
gress reports by the project manager; and (4) solution development re-
cords.
The Solution Development Record, which is the principal source of
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the data presented in this paper, is a research tool which provides a
record over time of the progress of an individual engineer or group of
engineers (or scientists) toward the solution of a technical problem.
The lead engineer responsible for each subproblem is asked to provide
a weekly estimate, for each alternative approach under consideration, of
the probabi I ity that it wi I I be final ly chosen as the solution to that
subprob I em.
Referring to Figure I, i f at some point in the design the respondent
were considering two technical approaches to rendezvous at Uranus, and
he were completely uncommitted between the two, he would circle 0.5
for each, as shown. Eventually as the solution progresses, one alter-
native wi I I attain a I .0 probabi I ity and the others wi I I become zero.
By plotting the probabilities over time, we obtain a graphic record of
the solution history. Alternative approaches are identified from the
contract work statement, when so specified, or from the responsible en-
gineer when he is interviewed prior to beginning the task. Blank
spaces are always provided so that new approaches may be reported as they
arise. In cases where a respondent believes there is some probability
of choosing an approach which he cannot clearly specify at the time, he
is instructed to assign a probability to an approach which he may call
"other."
A copy of the form is mailed every week to each respondent. The
forms are sufficiently flexible, so that new alternatives may be incorpora-
ted, old ones dropped, and in instances in which an early solution is
reached and "frozen", subproblems at the next level may be substituted.

The Sol'ution Development Record, by economizing on the respondent's
time, provides a quite efficient record of a problem history. When the
project is completed, each respondent is presented with a time-plot of
his probability estimates, and is interviewed at some length to detei
—
mine causes and effects of design changes reflected in this record.
The plot thus provides a stimulus to the man's memory and assists the
investigator in gathering a detailed record of each project.
The three projects under consideration, involved in the following
general problems:
1. The design of the reflector portion of a rather large
and highly complex antenna system for tracking and
communication with space vehicles at very great dis-
tances.
2. The design of a vehicle and associated instrumentation
to roam the lunar surface and gather descriptive
scient i f i c data.
3. An investigation of passive methods for transfer of modu-
lation between two coherent light beams.
Only the first of these will be discussed in any detail. All three
are considered in the aggregate statistics of our data.
RESULTS
The plot of Solution Development Record points over time (Figure 2)

FIGURE I
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Solution Development Record
Manned Uranus Landing in an Early Time Period Study
General United Aerospace Corporation
Name Date
____
Estimate of Probabl lity that Alternative will
be Employed
Subproblem #1: Method of
rendezvous at Uranus
Alternative approaches:
orbital rendezvous mi ss ion 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 (p.s) 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
with excursion vehicle
orbital rendezvous mission 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
without excursion vehicle
direct mission 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 {0J) 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Subproblem #2: Design of the
electrical power supply subsystem
for the space vehicle
Alternative approaches:
hydrogen-oxygen 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 (Q) 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
fuel eel I
K0H fuel cell 0.1 0.2 (CK3) 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Rank ine cycle fast reactor 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Rank ine cycle thermal reactor 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Brayton cycle reactor (oj) 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
___
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

provides a rather interesting perspective on the history of a project
and illustrates the intimate relation between technical information in-
puts and problem solving process.
We can see here the approaches followed by two engineering groups
(labelled Lab A and Lab B) in the design of the reflector surface for
an antenna. While both teams ultimately decided upon the same general
approach, they arrived there by quite different routes. A brief sum-
mary of the history of the two solution processes for this subproblem
will explain much of this difference, and will provide some background
substance for much of the data to be presented later.
Rather early in the study, as indicated by flag notes A- I and B-2,
the customer agency supplied both contractors with the results of an
experiment to determine the wind loadings which would be experienced by
the antenna. As a result, approach p rose in favor at both labs. Prior
to this time, Lab A showed considerable vacillation among the three al-
ternatives; Lab B, during this early period, conducted an intensive lit-
erature search but failed to uncover any evidence of empirical or ana-
lytical work having been done with flat aerodynamic shapes at the low
air speeds under consideration.
At A-2 Lab A's aerodynamic staff reported wind load moments for ap-
proach "V to be about twice that for o( or fd> . At the same time, the
electromagnetic staff reported that approaches (j\ and p satisfactorily
met electrical requirements up to 3 gigacycles.
An electromagnetic analysis by Lab B shows that approach c{ failed to
satisfy the electrical performance specification. This is indicated by
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DESIGN OF ANTENNA RADIATION SUBSYSTEM

flagnote B-3. During the same period (B-4), this laboratory at-
tempted to extrapolate from previously acquired data (an earlier
antenna) to estimate wind loads.
About the twelfth week (A-3) Lab A conducted a wind tunnel study,
which showed that approach p resulted in a wind torque considerably
larger than that predicted by the customer's data (A-l). Since ap-
proach <f\ did not perform as well as ft , electrically, one of three
things now had to be done. E'ther the aerodynamic specification
had to be relaxed, a penalty in electrical performance accommodated,
or a new alternative meeting both the aerodynamic specifications and
the electrical performance level of approach d had to be generated.
The latter possibility did not present itself, so negotiations with
the customer over specifications were pursued.
The customer subsequently allowed a relaxation of the electrical
specification (A-4) and approach A rose in favor. The change in speci-
fication was provided to Lab B as well, but there was no consequent
change in the probability level of approach A . This undoubtedly
resulted from the fact that B did not have as complete information
as A regarding approach p. The brief drop in p's position at
Lab B (B-5) was a result of some doubts which this lab had concerning
the feasibility of the approach, but as far as can be determined this
was not based upon hard data. Following this brief period of skepti-
cism, p rose rapidly to a 1.0 level (B-6) and was further established
there when, as indicated by B-7, information concerning special fabri-
cating machinery became available.
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At Lab A, meanwhile, approach Rencountered some difficulty with
the cost analysts. And we see a resulting dropoff at note A-5. Lab
A remained indifferent between
,j( and p for quite some time while trade-
off studies were pursued (A-6). Numerous contacts were made with ven-
dors to determine the costs associated with various elaborations of
the two approaches.
Finally, at A-7, information was obtained from the Weather Bureau
which allowed a 20$ reduction in the wind loading specification. This
information was instrumental in Lab A's decision to adopt approach p .
The work statement for the subsystem under consideration suggested
three technical approaches, and these were the only ones considered
by the two teams. That this is not always the case can be demonstrated
by a look at another of the antenna subsystems (Figure 3).
Here we see design histories for the position feedback subsystem.
Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the protocol for this
subproblem, so we will merely point out the introduction of new ap-
proaches during the course of the project. The work statement for
both labs suggested approaches c{ ,p and J Both rejected these,
however, and generated two new approaches each ( <g , <f , 3 and y ) . In
both labs one of the new approaches resulted from difficulties incur-
red by the currently preferred approach; the other resulted from re-
ceipt of new information, and was independent of the state of approaches
currently under consideration.
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Decay Time for Rejected Approaches
There are a number of ways in which the data contained in these
plots can be analyzed. Looking at the time required for rejection or
introduction of approaches, we see that old ideas are not dispensed
with very abruptly, nor do new ideas rise very rapidly. Once an R & D
group has committed very much time to the design of a particular ap-
proach, it is not easily convinced that this approach should be dropped.
Analysis of 31 instances shows that a once dominant idea takes about
six or seven weeks on the average to be completely rejected. Domin-
ance is defined as being in the preferred position in the probability
plot. Decay time is measured in two ways:
1. if the old approach is replaced by a new idea, decay time
is the period between introduction of the new idea and the
point at which the old approach reaches a probability of
zero and stays there.
2. if the old approach is replaced by one of the approaches
initially considered, decay time is the period between the
point at which the two approaches trade dominance or reach a
tied position, and the point at which the rejected idea reaches
zero and stays there.
There is a clear relation between decay time and time in dominance.
(r=0.54, p^O.OOl) The longer an idea is preferred, the more inertia is
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (r) with a probabi-
lity of occurrence (p) of a coefficient this high, under the null hypothe-
sis of no relation, less than 0.001. The correlation coefficient varies
in magnitude from zero to one and is an index of goodness of fit to a least-
squares straight line.

built up, and the less easily is it rejected. This is independent of
the absolute level of preference (r=0.03) and of the number of other
alternatives being considered (r=-0.04).
As engineers invest time and effort in the formulation and deve-
lopment of a technical approach, they become more and more committed
to that approach, and hence more resistant to d i sconf i rmi ng informa-
tion. An analogy may be drawn here to Bruner's (1957) paradigm of
the decision sequence in perception. During the initial consideration
of a new idea, the engineer is relatively "open" to stimulation from
his information environment. As the amount of confirming information
increases, he raises his probability estimate for the alternative and
nodifies his search behavior. The "openness" to new information de-
creases sharply now. The longer he retains the approach in a dominant
position with respect to its alternatives, the more he attenuates
his search behavior. At this point he enters a stage quite analogous to
Bruner's final stage in perceptual identification, where:
"...openness to additional cues is drastically reduced,
and either normalized or 'gated out.' Experiments...
suggest that once an object has been categorized in a
high-probability, good-fit category, the threshold for
recognizing cues contrary to this categorization increases
by almost an order of magnitude." (p. 131)
What is being suggested here is that an engineer tends to develop
a similar threshold as be becomes committed to a technical approach, and
that this threshold severely inhibits the effect of information which
should tell him that the approach is defective in some way. In addition,
it appears to gate out information related to new alternative approaches.

Examination of protocol data reveals that the vast majority of new
alternatives introduced during the course of a problem result from an
active search resulting from some defect in the currently preferred ap-
proach. Seldom does a new idea enter the system solely on its own
merit
.
From studies of perception, and the receipt by an engineer of new
technical information is certainly a complex form of perception* there
is a great deal of support for this threshold hypothesis. McGinnies
(1949), has demonstrated a physiological defense mechanism in the human
organism, and a tendency toward higher recognition thresholds for ta-
boo as compared to neutral words. Bruner and Postman (1949) have de-
monstrated a tendency to fixate upon an early perceptual hypothesis
and to subsequently resist the recognition of d i sconf i rmi ng information.
Postman, Bruner and Walk (1951) have shown the operation of such a
threshold to gate out those signals which would tend to disconfirm a
perceptual hypothesis.
Relatively few data are available in the purely cognitive area.
One may, however, hypothesize that the operation of threshold develop-
ment in this context is a result of the progressive buildup of cogni-
tive organization, i.e., of the multiplexity and i nterconnectedness of
the engineer's cognition of his design.
This can be illustrated by considering an engineer designing, for
example, a power supply. At the start of the problem he may know little
concerning specific alternatives, except that they are different and
have certain very general characteristics which may or may not be ex-
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pected to fulfill the needs of the problem. As he gains more informa-
tion concerning an alternative, ho shifts, gradually, from thinking of
it as simply a 'radioisotope power supply" and comes to think of it
as a "radioisotope thermionic supply": employing Cm 242; having a cer-
tain amount and kind of lead shielding; weighing four pounds; genera-
ting twelve watts of effective power; and having an operating temperature
of 1500 K. In addition to this increase in mu I t i d imens iona I i ty ormulti-
plexity of the concept, it becomes progressively more interconnected or
integrated into the design of the system. Several other subsystem de-
signs will usually be dependent upon the solution to a particular sub-
problem such that there is a great deal of interdependence among the
subsystems. As the design progresses these i nterdependencies become
stronger and more pronounced. Various decisions in, for example, the
instrumentation subsystem of a space vehicle are dependent upon the
power supply design. Changes in that design imply changes in instru-
mentation which in turn imply changes elsewhere and so on. Such
changes become more difficult to make as time progresses.
All of this is reflected to some extent in the cognitive struc-
ture of the engineer designing the power supply. As the organization
of his cognitive map progressively increases, it becomes more and more
difficult for him to envisage fundamental changes. It seems perfectly
reasonable then that his cognitive system should become more resistant
to change and that a threshold against information implying fundamental
change should build up as part of this process. As a solution alterna-
tive becomes more embedded in a growing cognitive organization, it deve-
lops a greater resistance to change.
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This phenomenon can be seen quite often in the protocol data. An
engineer decides rather early to pursue a particular alternative and
formulates his design to a considerable degree of sophistication. Then
he is confronted with information that something is wrong with one of
the dimensions: perhaps it begins to appear to be too costly, or the
design has become too complex and has sacrificed reliability. This
information may be ignored at first, or an inordinate amount of effort
may be expended in attacking this aspect of the problem (which might
readily appear intractible to an equally experienced outsider). At
length he comes around and accepts the necessity for basic modification
in the design, but the process usually requires a considerable amount
of time and energy for its accomplishment.
In all of this, it is not our intent to deny the affective com-
ponent. Despite the norm of dispassionateness, engineers do become
committed to their own designs. This commitment undoubtedly develops
2
with time. But such commitment should also be a function of the
uniqueness of the design, and in the instances under examination few
of the rejected approaches could be considered to be really very novel.
Furthermore, the engineers were in a position to claim full credit for
the development of the replacement idea and had little to lose and
actually something to gain through rejection of the old ideas.
2
For a fascinating discussion of this problem, the reader is re-
ferred to an article by T. C. Chamber I i n originally published in 1890
and reprinted in Sci ence
,
1 48 , 7 May 1965, pp. 754-759.

Number of Alternative Approaches Considered
Engineers considered from one to eight approaches to a subproblem
with a median of three. (Teble I). Two of the three approaches were
considered from the beginning of the project, with a median of one
new approach arising during the project's course.
TABLE I
Median Number of Alternative Approaches Considered
(20 Subproblem Pairs; Three Parallel Projects)
median range
total 3 1-8
initial 2 1-5
add it iona
I
I
0-5
The ideas which come up later in the project have a success rate of
about 15$, compared with a success rate of 39.5$ for initially considered
approaches. Eighty per cent of the approaches finally adopted were among
those initially considered. Only 20 per cent of solutions originated
during the course of the study.
Considering once again the total number of alternative approaches
considered by the engineers, it was hypothesized that this number should

bear a direct relation to solution quality. More specifically, the
hypothesis stated that the greater the number of alternative approaches
considered to a subprob lem, the better the quality of the solution to
that subproblem.
On eight of the 20 subproblem pairs in the sample, relative eval-
uations of the solutions were obtained from responsible technical moni-
tors in the government agency. In the remaining twelve, scores were
either tied or no evaluation was available. This relative evaluation
permits the use of simple tests between the number of alternatives con-
sidered and judged quality of the solution.
Not only is the hypothesis concerning total number of alternatives,
not supported by the data, but as can be seen from Table II, the rela-
tion is in the opposite direction.
Engineers submitting highei— rated solutions actually consider
fewer alternatives than their lower-rated competitors. This not only
contradicts the hypothesis but appears to be in direct conflict with
previous findings. Allen and Marquis (1964) in a study of two R&D
proposal competitions found that teams considering a larger number of
approaches to a proposal subproblem were better able to overcome ne-
gative transfer from related prior experience. Furthermore, going back
to the data from the earlier study, it is found that proposal teams sub-
mitting successful solutions had considered 2.13 approaches, on the aver-
age, compared with a mean of 1.71 for teams with unsuccessful solutions.
"Success" was determined by technical eva I uators in the customer agency.
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Since proposal competitions represent a relatively early phase in
the R&D process, the possibility remains that the relation between
number of alternatives and quality is a function of problem phase, and
that this relation shifts direction as the project progresses beyond
its initial phase. To test this possibility the number of approaches
considered initially are separated out and compared. As can be seen
in Table 11^ this difference is still in a direction which favors the
lower-rated subproblems, but is reduced in magnitude and far from statis-
tical significance. The last line in the table shows that the real dis-
tinction between the two sets lies in the number of alternatives generated
when a team encounters trouble with one of their initial approaches, and
this difficulty is reflected in a greater number of alternatives generated
during the later stages of the problem and in the quality of the solu-
tion.
TABLE I I
Mean Number of Alternative Approaches
Considered per Subproblem
(Eight Subproblem Pairs)
subproblems with subproblems with p
higher-rated lower-rated (as determined
solutions solutions by t test)
4.37 0.06
2.63 0.10
1.75 0.05
total
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Number of Alternative Approaches Considered Simultaneously
In Figures 2 and 3 it may be noted that there is a distinct tendency
for engineers to consider but two or three alternatives at any given time.
During the course of a problem, they may consider as many as eight altei—
natives, but they seldom report considering all of these at once. The
mean number of alternatives simultaneously considered ranges from one
to five with a mean of 2.20. These statistics are based upon those weeks
prior to the point at which one of the approaches attains a probability
of 1.0 and stays there. Inclusion of reports received beyond that point
would obviously lower the mean value.
Figure 4 provides a relative frequency distribution of simultaneously
considered alternatives and is based upon weekly reports. The strong
central tendency around two alternatives, and the sharp cutoff above
three can be seen quite readily from this figure.
Since evaluations of solution quality are available for eight of
the 20 subproblem pairs, a comparison was made between the means for
groups submitting lower and higher-rated solutions. On the average
those producing higher rated solutions considered 2.08 alternatives at a
time; lower rated teams considered 2.42 alternatives at a time. The dif-
ference between means is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
Frequency distributions of alternatives (figure 5) for the rela-
tively higher and lower rated performances show that those teams turning
in better performances come much closer to the ideal of two at a time.
In fact, 8\% of the time they report considering only two alternatives

FIGURE 4
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(58J? for lower-rated) and they never report considering more than three
alternatives. A Kolmogorov-Smi rnov two-sample test (Siege I 1956) re-
jects the null hypothesis that these two samples are drawn from the
same universe (p<O.OOI).
It thus appears that more successful engineers differ from their
brethren who are poorer problem-solvers in the manner in which they
trade off and consider alternative solution possibilities. Further,
the principal difference appears to be the tendency toward limiting
their consideration to two alternatives at a time.
Why should this be so? A number of investigators, (Miller, 1965;
Hayes, 1962; Santa Barbara and Pare, 1965) have demonstrated a finite
limitation on human information processing capacity. Neimack and
Wagner have shown further that amount of information gathering is a
linear function of log 2 r> (where n is the number of possible solutions).
While their measure of information gathering is the number of discrete
steps taken in a rather limited type of problem, it does seem clear
that the amount of information which must be processed should increase
with the number of alternatives being considered. Hayes (1962) has
shown quality of solution in a decision-making context to be indepen-
dent of the amount of information (number of characteristics) provided
on each alternative, but to be significantly decreased as the number
of alternatives is increased from four to eight. Increasing the number
of characteristics increases the dimensionality of the judgement. Miller
(1956), in his summary of a large number of studies has shown that in-

creasing the number of dimensions operates through the intervening var-
iable of codability to improve information transfer capacity at a some-
what less than linear rate. Increasing the number of alternatives, on
the other hand, does not ease codability and merely adds directly to the
amount of information to be processed. In this same line, De Groot
(1964), in a study of chess strategies, finds that grandmasters rather
severely limit the number of alternative moves which they consider in
formulating strategy. Yh'tema and Torgerson (1961) in a discussion of
future research on evaluative decisions predict the key concept to
be that of problem simplification. They mention a number of possible
strategies for reducing the number of facts which must be considered
at one time, and thereby lessening "cognitive strain".
From the data reported here, it appears that engineers operate
to reduce "cognitive strain" through the heuristic of reducing the
number of alternative solutions under consideration at any time.
Furthermore, this appears to be an effective heuristic since the data
show a clear relation to solution quality.
The better-performing engineers in our sample, when confronted
with this difficulty managed to cope with it through the heuristic of
comparing two alternatives at a time, temporarily rejecting one while
bringing up another for comparison, thus proceeding through as many as
eight alternatives on a two-at-a-t ime basis.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the paper has demonstrated the feasibility of a new
technique for the study of the i & D process. This technique employs
the vehicle of parallel projects lo provide a control over the substance
of the problem and to enable a relative evaluation of solutions. Data
are gathered by means of Solution Development Records, which report the
probability of adoption associated with each solution alternative on a
weekly basis, and by before and after interviews with the engineers.
The principal conclusions of the study are:
1. When a technical approach to an engineering problem be-
comes preferred over any other, it is not easily re-
jected; and the longer it is in a dominant position,
the more difficult it becomes to reject.
2. Groups producing higher-rated solutions generated fewer
new approaches during the course of the project. There
is some indication that these arise when the favored
approach encounters difficulty, and are probably sumpto-
matic of poor early choices.
3. R&D groups trade alternatives off on a two-at-a-t ime
basis. And the better-performing groups come closer to
this ideal than do their rivals. This appears to be
the result of limitations on the ability of humans to
process information. The consideration of more than
two multidimensional alternatives of the sort studied
may approach channel capacity.
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